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COMMENT

EXPENSIVE FREE SPEECH: WESTERN TRADITION
PARTNERSHIP AND THE SILENCING OF THE PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE
Jesse Kodadek*

The executive branch—especially the Attorney General—is tasked
with ensuring the laws and constitutional mandates of this State are faithfully executed.1 But sometimes, the government fails to properly enforce
the law or litigate constitutional issues significant to its citizens.2 Acknowledging this problem, courts have recognized the concept of the “private
attorney general.”3 A private attorney general is usually understood as a
party litigating on behalf of the public interest, but on its own initiative, and
“with no accountability to the government or the electorate.”4
But when a private party is compelled to litigate on behalf of the general public, who should fund the litigation? Recognizing the occasional necessity for private enforcement of public interests, some state courts have
held that when a private party is forced to vindicate constitutional issues
that would benefit the public at large, that party may be entitled to an award
* The author currently practices civil litigation in Missoula. This article began as a seminar paper
during Montana Constitutional Law, which was taught by Justice James Nelson and Professor Anthony
Johnstone in the spring of 2013. The author would like to thank them both for their input on this topic.
Additional thanks to the editors and staff of the Montana Law Review.
1. Mont. Const. art. VI, § 4; Mont. Code Ann. § 2–15–501 (2013) (setting forth the duties of the
Attorney General). See also Montana Constitutional Convention Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V, 866–870
(published 1972) (discussing whether the Attorney General should be appointed by governor or elected
by popular vote).
2. See e.g. Matter of Dearborn Drainage Area, 782 P.2d 898, 900 (Mont. 1989).
3. See Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, L. & Contemp. Probs.
179 (1998) (discussing the history of the concept and term).
4. Id.
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of attorney fees if it prevails.5 The award of fees on this basis is known as
the “private attorney general doctrine.”6
The Montana Supreme Court first applied the doctrine in 1999.7 In the
seminal Montrust case, the Court held it appropriate to award attorney fees
when a private party is forced to vindicate constitutional issues of societal
importance.8 Since that decision, the issue has been litigated a number of
times, but the Supreme Court has rarely awarded fees under the doctrine,
and Montrust remains the only time the Court has done so against the
State.9
In November of 2012, the issue again came before the Court.10 There,
the plaintiff, Western Tradition Partnership (“WTP”),11 prevailed against
the State at the Supreme Court of the United States in an unsurprising summary reversal.12 On remand, the Montana Supreme Court addressed WTP’s
claim for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.13 Yet,
after recognizing that the First Amendment “constitutional principles underlying this litigation cannot be doubted,” and despite alluding to the fact that
WTP’s litigation met at least some of the factors sufficient to entitle it to an
award under the doctrine, the Court nevertheless held that because the Montana Attorney General defended the statute in good faith, WTP was not
entitled to an award of attorney fees.14
The problem with this holding is that the private attorney general doctrine—as previously defined by the Court and as defined by other states—
does not consider bad faith. Indeed, nothing in the test for whether a party is
entitled to fees under the doctrine requires or relates to bad faith on any
level. More importantly, the bad faith statute15 relied upon by the Court
5. See e.g. Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977).
6. Id.
7. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Commrs., 989
P.2d 800 (Mont. 1999) [hereinafter Montrust].
8. Id. at 811–812.
9. W. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen. of State, 291 P.3d 545, 549 (Mont. 2012) [hereinafter
WTP II]. But, as discussed below, the Court has remanded at least one other case for reconsideration of
fees under the private attorney general doctrine “in light of Montrust,” and the State subsequently stipulated to a fee award of nearly $500,000 in favor of the plaintiffs. See Columbia Falls Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 264 (Mont. 2005). This is discussed more thoroughly below.
10. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 545.
11. WTP is now known as the American Tradition Partnership. But on remand, the Montana Supreme Court continued to refer to it as the Western Tradition Partnership, and in the interests of clarity,
this article will do the same.
12. W. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen. of State, 271 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2011) [hereinafter WTP I]
cert. granted, judgment rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (U.S.
2012). WTP I factual issues relevant to the discussion are addressed as necessary below.
13. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 547–548. The issue was not addressed in WTP I because the Court’s
decision had rendered it moot. WTP I, 271 P.3d at 13.
14. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 549.
15. Mont. Code Ann. § 25–10–711. This statute is discussed in greater detail below.
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does not require any analysis of the private attorney general factors. Put
another way, the bad faith statute creates an independent basis for fee
awards that is totally separate from the private attorney general doctrine.16
If the WTP II Court was correct, then the private attorney general doctrine
has been rendered essentially meaningless—at least as it applies to actions
against the State.17
The second problem with this holding is even more troubling. Because
the Attorney General has an obligation to uphold the laws of the State,18 in
most cases, only private enforcement can vindicate the public interest in a
challenge to the constitutionality of a state law.19 Therefore, without the
private attorney general theory, it is possible that—unless the plaintiff could
recover a significant compensatory award or is funded by a large constituency with deep pockets—some important public interest litigation may
never happen.20
If the WTP II Court wanted to eliminate the private attorney general
doctrine, it could and should have done so explicitly. Instead, it misapplied
the bad faith statute, failed to properly analyze the relevant factors related to
the private attorney general doctrine, and confused or conflated WTP’s request for fees under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act with its alternative request for fees under the private attorney general theory. In doing so,
the Court eviscerated the private attorney general doctrine and utterly confused an area of law the Court had previously applied consistently and methodically.
This comment has two parts. The first and most important part provides an overview of the private attorney general doctrine as previously
applied in Montana, and looks at the Court’s analysis of the doctrine in a
variety of contexts. It also discusses the application of the bad faith statute
as it relates to the private attorney general doctrine, and shows the Court
has never conflated the two ideas, and in fact, has expressly repudiated the
idea that bad faith has any relevance under the doctrine. The last part argues
that—despite undeniably legitimate concerns about the actions and underlying motivations of the Western Tradition Partnership—the Montana Supreme Court got it wrong in WTP II, and suggests that, due to the societal
importance of encouraging private litigation for the benefit of the public
16. See WTP II, 291 P.3d at 551 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
17. While not addressed by the majority, based on the extremely broad holding, the bad faith requirement may apply to the doctrine even when only private actions are implicated.
18. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–15–501 (setting forth the duties of the Attorney General).
19. The author recognizes the State does, on rare occasion, decline to defend the validity of certain
statutes. See also Part II, infra.
20. William B. Rubenstein, On What A Private Attorney General Is—and Why It Matters, 57 Vand.
L. Rev. 2129, 2141–2142 (2004).
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interest, the Court should not apply a bad faith test to future claims for fees
under the private attorney general doctrine.
To be clear, the point of this comment is not to recreate the dissent in
WTP II, which reached the right result. Instead, it is more properly read as a
supplement to that dissent, and a rebuttal to the majority’s insertion of a bad
faith analysis into the private attorney general doctrine, a conflation of two
independent issues which silenced the private attorney general doctrine—
ironically perhaps—in a case that is about fundamental First Amendment
principles.
I. A

SHORT21 HISTORY OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DOCTRINE IN

MONTANA

Montana follows the American Rule, and absent a specific statutory or
contractual provision, a prevailing party—whether prosecuting or defending
an action—is generally not entitled to attorney fees.22 Besides statutory23
and contractual24 exceptions, however, there are also several equitable exceptions to the American Rule. Montana recognizes at least three distinct
categories of those equitable exceptions: the common fund or substantial
benefit exception, which authorizes the spread of fees among individuals
benefitting from litigation which creates, reserves, or increases a pool of
money available to individuals who did not participate in the litigation;25 a
catchall equitable exception to make a party whole if forced to defend a
frivolous or malicious action;26 and finally, the private attorney general
doctrine.27

21. And non-exhaustive.
22. See e.g. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 548 (collecting cases). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the rule as far back as 1796, when overturning a decision granting attorney fees as part of damages on
the ground that “[t]he general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice
were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or
modified, by statute.” Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 1 (1796).
23. See e.g. Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–133(3) (providing availability of fees for prevailing party in
Consumer Protection Act case). There are many others.
24. Id. at § 28–3–704 (contractual right to attorney fees to be treated as reciprocal).
25. See e.g. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 38 P.3d 828 (Mont. 2001). To establish the entitlement to fees under the common fund doctrine, a party must create, reserve, or increase a
pool of money; the active beneficiary must incur legal fees attributable to the establishment of the fund;
and the fund must benefit ascertainable and non-participating beneficiaries. Id. at 828–829.
26. See e.g. Foy v. Anderson, 580 P.2d 114, 116–117 (Mont. 1978); Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Am. Bankers
Ins. Co. of Florida, 19 P.3d 223 (Mont. 2001) (collecting cases limiting Foy to actions where party
asserting an entitlement to fees was “forced to defend against a wholly frivolous or malicious action”).
27. This article discusses only this category.
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A. Bean Lake II
The Montana Supreme Court first recognized the private attorney general doctrine in Bean Lake II,28 a 1989 case where an intervenor in a water
rights adjudication successfully opposed a claim of the Department of Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks.29 After finding that the case was “precedent-setting”
and significant to all water users in the state, the Water Court held that
because the intervenor assumed “a burden which was disproportionate” to
its specific interest in the case, the unique circumstances of the case justified an award of fees against the Department.30
The Department appealed, arguing that the bad faith statute at
§ 25–10–71131 meant that the sole basis for an award of attorney fees
against a state agency was if the claim or defense asserted by the agency
was frivolous or pursued in bad faith.32 The Supreme Court, without directly addressing the Department’s arguments regarding the allegedly
preclusive nature of the bad faith statute, reversed the award of attorney
fees.33 The Court first noted the Montana Water Use Act specifically contemplates that disputes will arise during the adjudication process, but—tellingly—the Act does not provide for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party.34 The Court also recognized that the Act charges the Department with the protection and enhancement of state resources, including
advocating for the water rights necessary to ensure the well-being of fish,
wildlife, and scenic values necessary to comply with its mandate, and therefore the Department was simply acting pursuant to its duties.35
Further, the Court found that the dispute over Bean Lake was “really
no more than an ordinary water rights dispute.”36 It recognized that the
intervenor—the Montana Stockgrowers Association—was a private organization representing approximately 3,000 farmers and ranchers across the
28. Matter of Dearborn Drainage Area, 782 P.2d 898 (Mont 1989) [hereinafter Bean Lake II].
29. Id. at 899.
30. Id. (The Water Court did not rely on the private attorney general doctrine in its fee award, so
the Supreme Court did not reverse on that ground.).
31. Mont. Code Ann. § 25–10–711 (2011) (stating “(1) In any civil action brought by or against the
state, a political subdivision, or an agency of the state or a political subdivision, the opposing party,
whether plaintiff or defendant, is entitled to the costs enumerated in 25–10–201 and reasonable attorney
fees as determined by the court if: (a) the opposing party prevails against the state, political subdivision,
or agency; and (b) the court finds that the claim or defense of the state, political subdivision, or agency
that brought or defended the action was frivolous or pursued in bad faith. (2) Costs may be granted
pursuant to subsection (1) notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary”).
32. Bean Lake II, 782 P.2d at 899.
33. Id. at 899–900.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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state.37 Because many of the members owned water rights, the group had “a
distinct economic and philosophical interest in the uses and adjudication of
the waters within the State” and also “represent[ed] primarily a private agricultural interest.”38
Finally, the Court rejected the Stockgrowers’ assertion that it was entitled to fees under the private attorney general doctrine. The Court noted the
doctrine is “normally utilized when the government, for some reason, fails
to properly enforce interests which are significant to its citizens.”39 The
Court concluded the Department “acted in good faith and in accordance
with constitutional and statutory mandates in making its claims at Bean
Lake,” and therefore reversed the attorney fee award.40 In sum, while the
Court discussed the bad faith statute and briefly mentioned the private attorney general doctrine, it did not hold that an award under the private attorney
general doctrine requires a showing that the opposing party acted in bad
faith.
B. Montrust
Ten years later, the Court awarded fees under the private attorney general theory for the first time. In Montanans for the Responsible Use of the
School Trust v. State ex rel. Board of Land Commissioners41 (“Montrust”),
the plaintiffs succeeded in their challenge to a statutory scheme they alleged
violated the constitutional mandate requiring the Board to maximize income
from school trust lands.42
Despite concluding Montrust prevailed on its constitutional challenge,
the district court denied its request for attorney fees, finding that because
the action involved “neither frivolous conduct, extreme conduct, nor bad
faith by the State,” § 25–10–711 precluded the grant of fees.43 On crossappeal, Montrust argued that, regardless of the bad faith statute, they were
entitled to fees under the private attorney general doctrine.44
The Court first recognized that a number of other jurisdictions had
adopted the private attorney general doctrine.45 It then turned to Serrano v.
Priest,46 a 1977 California case adopting the doctrine in that state. There,
37. Id.
38. Bean Lake II, 782 P.2d at 899–900.
39. Id. at 900.
40. Id.
41. Montrust, 989 P.2d 800.
42. Id. at 806, 808–809.
43. Id. at 810.
44. Id. at 810–811.
45. Id. at 811.
46. Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977). (In the first California legislative session following Serrano, California codified the private attorney general doctrine in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5
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the California Supreme Court set forth three factors to be considered in
such an award: “(1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy
vindicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and
the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, (3) the number of
people standing to benefit from the decision.”47
The Montana Court repeated some of the California Court’s concerns,
namely that courts could be “thrust into the role of making assessments of
the relative strength or weakness of public policies furthered by their decisions and of determining at the same time which public policy should be
encouraged by an award of fees, and which not—a role closely approaching
that of the legislative function.”48 Nevertheless, following the reasoning of
Serrano, the Montana Supreme Court determined that concern was ameliorated by the public policy furthered by the litigation, and adopted the threefactor Serrano test.49
Turning to the analysis of the test, the Court first determined that Montrust “litigated important public policies that are grounded in Montana’s
Constitution.”50 Second—and crucially—the Court noted that the attorney
general’s duty to defend the statutory scheme was precisely why private
enforcement was required to enforce constitutional interests vindicated in
(2014) which provides, in part: “Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party
against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary,
has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are
such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out
of the recovery, if any.” As this statute shows, the California Legislature not only embraced the Serrano
formulation of the doctrine, but actually broadened it to include potential awards for one public entity
against another and clarified that an award of compensatory damages need not limit or offset fee awards
under the statute. In contrast to California, other state legislatures have enacted statutes barring recovery
under the private attorney general theory. For example, in a 1994 decision where a private party in Utah
successfully challenged the Utah Public Service’s rate-setting scheme, the Utah Supreme Court awarded
the plaintiffs fees under the doctrine. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 783–784 (Utah
1994). In 2009, Utah barred any further awards under the private attorney general doctrine. Most states,
however, have left it to the courts to determine whether the private attorney general is a proper basis for
fee awards. As a limited example, the following decisions have affirmed the viability of the doctrine:
Arnold v. Arizona Dep’t of Health Servs., 775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz. 1989); Yes on Prop 200 v. Napolitano, 160 P.3d 1216 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp. of State of Hawai’i,
202 P.3d 1226 (Haw. 2009); In re Lopez, 109 P.3d 1021 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 2005 WL
823684 (Colo. 2005); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 679 S.E.2d 512 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). In
contrast, the doctrine has been judicially rejected in a number of other states. See e.g. Doe v. Heintz, 526
A.2d 1318 (Conn. 1987), appeal after remand, 579 A.2d 37 (Conn. 1990); State Bd. of Tax Com’rs v.
Town of St. John, 751 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. 2001); Pearson v. Board of Health of Chicopee, 525 N.E.2d 400
(Mass. 1988); New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 986 P.2d 450 (N.M. 1999); Fordice v.
Thomas, 649 So.2d 835 (Miss. 1995).
47. Montrust, 989 P.2d at 812 (quoting Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314).
48. Id. at 811–812 (quoting Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314).
49. Id. at 812.
50. Id.
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the action.51 Finally, the Court concluded that Montrust’s litigation “clearly
benefitted” “all Montana citizens interested in Montana’s public schools.”52
Based on these three factors, the Court held the district court abused its
discretion by ignoring “recognized principles” in denying Montrust attorney
fees, resulting in a “substantial injustice.”53 The Court therefore determined
Montrust was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general
theory.54
C. Finke
The next time the doctrine was seriously55 addressed was in Finke v.
State ex rel. McGrath.56 The plaintiffs were three individuals and six municipalities who challenged the constitutionality of SB 242.57 The proposed
statute involved the scope of county jurisdiction over building codes, and
would have limited voting on the geographic applicability of those codes to
“record owners of real property.”58 The defendants were the State through
the Attorney General, the Department of Labor and Industry, and the counties in which the six municipalities were located.59
The plaintiffs challenged the election provisions on a number of constitutional grounds, including violations of Article II, sections 4 (equal protection), 13 (unencumbered right of suffrage), and 17 (due process); Article
V, section 11(3) (mandating every legislative bill to contain only one subject) of the Montana Constitution; and the Fifth (due process) and Fourteenth Amendments (equal protection) of the U.S. Constitution.60
In sum, the Court agreed with all of the plaintiffs’ challenges, and
found SB 242 “disenfranchise[d] constituents” under both the Montana and
U.S. Constitutions.61
Next, the Court turned to the plaintiffs’ assertion they were entitled to
fees under the private attorney general doctrine. The Court first recited the
three factors established in Montrust, and did not disagree that the plaintiffs
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Montrust, 989 P.2d at 812.
54. Id.
55. As previously mentioned, this survey is not exhaustive. For example, on cross appeal, the prevailing plaintiff in the case establishing a stand-alone cause of action for violation of state constitutional
rights argued he was entitled to fees under the doctrine. But because he failed to raise the issue below,
the Court declined to consider it on appeal. Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128 (Mont. 2002).
56. Finke v. State ex rel. McGrath, 65 P.3d 576 (Mont. 2003). Due to the cross-governmental
parties, the case began as an original proceeding in the Supreme Court.
57. Id. at 579.
58. Id. at 578–579.
59. Id. at 579.
60. Id. at 579–580.
61. Id. at 581.
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had established a successful result under each factor.62 But the Court noted
a significant problem: it would be unjust to force the county defendants to
pay for the unconstitutional actions of the legislature.63 In other words, the
private attorney general theory is an equitable doctrine, and it would be
inequitable to award fees against counties “who neither fashioned nor
passed the unconstitutional law.”64
The Court then determined the only other party against whom fees
could be assessed was the State.65 But the Court held that two separate
issues barred a recovery against the State. First, the plaintiffs did not specifically seek fees against the State, and in any case, the injunction sought by
plaintiffs “simply [did] not provide a basis” for an award of fees.66 Second,
and more importantly, because the only proper basis for a fee award would
lie in the actions of the Legislature in enacting an unconstitutional bill (because the Attorney General had not actually enforced it yet), and the Legislature is immune from suit for any legislative act or omission, there was no
avenue whereby fees could be awarded against the State.67
Here again, just as in Montrust, the Court did not engage in any discussion of bad faith regarding the defendants’ conduct. Nor did it even raise
the issue of the bad faith statute. Instead, it focused on the equitable issues
surrounding the plaintiffs’ requests for fees, and determined that, because
the equities did not support an award of fees, the private attorney general
doctrine was inapplicable.
D. American Cancer Society
In American Cancer Society v. State,68 the plaintiffs sued the State,
alleging the Legislature’s attempt to void municipal ordinances barring
smoking in certain public establishments was unconstitutional.69 The Court
concluded the doctrine of implied preemption could not apply, but that,
instead of being unconstitutional, the statute instead merely had “no force
and effect.”70 The plaintiffs also requested attorney fees pursuant to the
private attorney general doctrine, but the Court held that, because the statute
was “ineffectual rather than unconstitutional,” the plaintiffs had vindicated
no constitutional interest and therefore no fees under the doctrine were war62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Finke, 65 P.3d at 582–583.
Id. at 582–583.
Id.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
Am. Cancer Socy. v. State, 103 P.3d 1085 (Mont. 2004).
Id. at 1087 (like in Finke, the Court assumed original jurisdiction).
Id. at 1090.
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ranted.71 Once again, the Court did not discuss bad faith, nor did it discuss
legislative immunity as it had in Finke.
E. Columbia Falls
In Columbia Falls Elementary School District No. 6 v. State,72 the
Court affirmed the district court’s decision that the funding system and educational product of the public school system was constitutionally infirm.73
In district court, the plaintiffs had pursued attorney fees under the private
attorney general doctrine, but the district court denied the request.74 On
cross appeal, and with almost no analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the
denial, and remanded for consideration of attorney fees “in light of Montrust.”75
Less than six weeks after the case was remanded and prior to any judicial determination in that context, the parties stipulated to a fee award of
over $499,000 in favor of the plaintiffs.76 Thus, while the Supreme Court’s
language did not expressly award fees in this case, the practical effect of its
decision resulted in such an award. Columbia Falls therefore became the
second time the Supreme Court had directed an award against the State
under the private attorney general doctrine.
F. Sunburst
In Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc.,77 the plaintiffs
(which included numerous private property owners) sued Texaco over extensive and widespread contamination of their properties. The plaintiffs
won a multi-million dollar judgment, and the district court awarded fees
pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine.78 On cross appeal, the
plaintiffs maintained the district court was correct, and the private attorney
general doctrine compelled a fee award.79 The plaintiffs argued: (1) the litigation vindicated important public policy regarding the proper measure of
damages for contamination, benefitting property owners throughout the
state; (2) private enforcement was necessary due to DEQ’s inaction in failing to properly monitor Texaco’s facilities and mandate cleanup; and (3)
71. Id. at 1090–1091.
72. Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005).
73. Id. at 262–263.
74. Id. at 264.
75. Id.
76. See Stip. Or. Awarding Atty. Fees, Mont. First Judicial Dist., Cause No. BVD-2002-528 (May
12, 2005).
77. Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007).
78. Id. at 1097.
79. Id. at 1097–1098.
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their litigation efforts caused them significant financial burden.80 Texaco
argued that because Sunburst won a substantial money judgment, an award
of attorney fees was unnecessary.81
The Court agreed with Texaco, noting that one of the purposes of the
private attorney general doctrine is to incentivize “public interest related
litigation that might otherwise be too costly to bring.”82 The Court added
that the private attorney general doctrine “was not designed as a method for
rewarding litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only
coincidentally protect the public interest.”83 Because the plaintiffs’ case resulted in a multi-million dollar judgment, they “needed no additional incentive” to litigate the matter.84 The Court therefore held that the district court
abused its discretion when it awarded fees to the plaintiffs under the private
attorney general doctrine, and vacated the award.85
G. Baxter
Another important case in the development of the doctrine is Baxter v.
State,86 where a terminally ill patient and a number of doctors brought an
action challenging the applicability of the homicide statutes to doctors who
provided aid in dying to terminal patients.87 On cross motions for summary
judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding the constitutional rights to dignity and privacy, when taken together, protect physicians who provide aid in dying.88 Following a post-judgment motion, the
district court also awarded the plaintiffs attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.89
On appeal, the Court affirmed the district court’s determination that
physician-assisted aid in dying is not contrary to public policy, but did so
on statutory instead of constitutional grounds.90 Therefore, because the private attorney general doctrine only applies “when constitutional interests
are vindicated,” the Court held that its statute-based holding could not support a fee award under the private attorney general doctrine.91
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1097–1098 (quoting Flannery v. California Highway Patrol, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 632, 635 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1998)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
87. Id. at 1214.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1221.
90. See e.g. id.
91. Id. at 1221. Additionally, the Court declined to uphold the award on alternate grounds. This
decision, while seemingly providing an important clarification regarding when fees are available, suffers
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H. Bitterroot River Protective Association
Bitterroot River Protective Association v. Bitterroot Conservation District92 is the most complex treatment of the private attorney general doctrine, and remains the only time the Court has affirmed an award under the
private attorney general doctrine against a private party. Plaintiffs Bitterroot
River Protective Association (“BRPA”), a local group dedicated to public
access and environmental protection, sought attorney fees from defendant
landowners after the Supreme Court held the Mitchell Slough was part of a
natural, perennially flowing stream (the Bitterroot River) and was therefore
subject to the “310 Law” and open to public access under the Stream Access Law (“SAL”).93
On remand from BRPA II, the district court conducted a hearing on
fees, and awarded over $300,000 in favor of the BRPA and against the
private landowners, but not against the Bitterroot Conservation District
(“BCD”) itself.94 The district court based the award on both the private
attorney general doctrine and the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act
(“UDJA”).95 The landowners appealed from that order.96 BRPA did not
contest the denial of fees against the BCD, and argued only that a fee award
against the landowner defendants was justified.
The Supreme Court’s decision began with the applicable standard of
review, which landowners asserted was a question of law, while only the
amount was reviewed for abuse of discretion.97 The Court disagreed, holding that abuse of discretion was the proper standard—the same standard as
an award under the UDJA.98 The Court therefore moved on to the landowners’ claim that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded fees
under the private attorney general doctrine.99
from a very limited examination of the difference between statutory and constitutional interests when, as
often happens, the two are interrelated.
92. Bitterroot River Protective Assn. v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 251 P.3d 131 (Mont. 2011).
This was the third time the case reached the Supreme Court and is therefore commonly referred to as
BRPA III.
93. Id. at 134–135. The “310 Law” is the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act. If a stream
qualifies as a natural and perennially flowing stream, then the local Conservation District controls all
projects within the bed and immediate banks. Here, the BCD had attempted to abrogate its jurisdiction
over the Mitchell Slough because it believed the Slough did not fall within the definition of a natural and
perennial stream. BRPA I and II held otherwise.
94. Id. The BCD is a governmental entity.
95. Id. (citing the UDJA “supplemental relief” statute at Mont. Code Ann. § 27–8–313).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Bitterroot River Protective Assn., 251 P.3d at 134–135.
99. Id. at 137.
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The Court applied the three-factor test Montrust adopted from Serrano,100 and added the Finke consideration of “whether an award would be
unjust under the circumstances.”101 The landowners contested the award
under each of the four factors.102
Under the first factor, landowners argued the decision in BRPA II “was
primarily one of statutory interpretation,” did not vindicate constitutional
interests, and therefore could not satisfy the first Montrust factor, which is
the “strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the
litigation.”103 BRPA responded that the doctrine does not require a direct
constitutional challenge, and even if the challenge was only statutory, it
nevertheless implicated important constitutional interests.104 The Court did
note the landowners were correct that, since Baxter and American Cancer
Society were decided on statutory grounds, those cases did not support an
award under the doctrine due to the concern that the first factor not become
judicial “assessments of the relative strength or weakness of public policies
furthered by their decisions . . . a role closely approaching that of the legislative function.”105 But the Court nonetheless found the statutes at issue in
BRPA II “directly implicated constitutional provisions,” and the holdings of
that case were “expressly premised upon [the statute’s] constitutional purpose.”106 Therefore, because the statutes at issue directly implicated the explicit constitutional rights to a clean and healthful environment,107 the preservation of water rights,108 and the preservation of the harvest heritage,109
the Court concluded the case was distinguishable from Baxter and American Cancer Society, and thus satisfied the first factor.110
Turning to the second factor,111 the Court noted that BCD’s and
FWP’s cross-governmental involvement complicated the issue.112 But more
importantly, the landowners had intervened in January of 2004, and it was
largely due to their ongoing actions that BRPA was forced into prolonged
and extensive litigation with up to 23 separate intervenors.113 Therefore,
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Finke, 65 P.3d at 583).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Bitterroot River Protective Assn., 251 P.3d at 137–138.
105. Id. (citing Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314, and Montrust, 989 P.2d at 812).
106. Id. at 138 (citing Mont. Const. art. IX §§ 1, 3).
107. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
108. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3.
109. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 7.
110. Bitterroot River Protective Assn., 251 P.3d at 138–139.
111. Id. at 139 (“The necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on
the plaintiff.”).
112. Id. at 140.
113. Id. at 138–140.
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due to the significant number of landowners arguing the Slough was not
within the realm of the 310 Law, and the fact that neither the BCD nor FWP
were directly responsible for the years of litigation, the Court determined
the second factor was met.114 Further supporting that conclusion, the Court
found that but for BRPA’s challenge to the initial BCD determination that
the 310 Law did not apply to the Slough, the BCD’s decision “may very
well still stand.”115
Addressing the third factor, the Court considered the number of people
standing to benefit from the litigation.116 The landowners argued the holding from BRPA II only applied to one body of water, did not revise the SAL
or 310 Law, any potential benefit was merely speculative, and the “precedential value [was] minimal.”117 In response, BRPA argued that the public
benefited directly, as it can now recreate on the Mitchell, the stream is protected from unregulated alteration, and the “precedential effect is substantial
for purposes of protecting other Montana waterways.”118 The Court agreed
with BRPA, and held that the case was of statewide importance, clarified
the status of other public waters, and recognized that recent efforts to enact
a constitutional initiative to remove bodies of water like the Mitchell from
the 310 Law demonstrated the importance of the case.119
Finally, the Court concluded an award would not be unjust under the
circumstances.120 The landowners argued that equitable considerations
weighed against an award for multiple reasons, including their defense of
their own property rights, a reliance on previous interpretations of the SAL
and 310 Law, and “that an award of private attorney general fees against
private parties is unfair.”121 But the Court again disagreed, reasoning that
prior to the litigation, BCD had issued numerous permits under the 310 Law
to conduct work on the Mitchell, and that there was longstanding recreational use which the landowners’ actions threatened to eliminate.122 The
Court thus affirmed the district court’s award in its entirety.123

114. Id.
115. Id. at 140.
116. Bitterroot River Protective Assn., 251 P.3d at 140.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Bitterroot River Protective Assn., 251 P.3d at 140.
123. Id. at 143. The Court also addressed and affirmed the district court’s calculations of the amount,
which the landowners had also contested.
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GOT IT WRONG AND

THREATENS THE VALIDITY OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DOCTRINE IN ANY CONTEXT

As Part I demonstrates, the bar for a successful award of attorney fees
under the private attorney general doctrine is high. Each and every time the
Montana Supreme Court considered the doctrine—from Bean Lake II in
1989 to BRPA III in 2011—the Court recognized why the doctrine existed:
to compensate a private party when it is forced to vindicate constitutional
issues of societal importance. None of the decisions preceding WTP II had
ever considered bad faith a factor in the determination of whether an award
was justified under the private attorney general doctrine. Instead, in each
decision, the Court analyzed the three Serrano factors and then, sometimes,
considered the overall equities of an award. Further, the Montrust Court
recognized that it was precisely the State’s duty to defend statutes that created “the necessity of private enforcement” of constitutional interests.124
But in WTP II, the Court veered widely off the established course, and
made a series of analytical mistakes that—if followed—will render the private attorney general doctrine meaningless. Before addressing WTP II’s
treatment of the doctrine, a brief review of the background facts and circumstances of that case is necessary.
A. A brief review of Western Tradition Partnership I
In WTP I, Western Tradition Partnership and a number of other business interests sued the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Political
Practices, alleging that § 13–35–227(1)—which prohibited corporate political expenditures on behalf of political candidates for in-state offices—infringed on their fundamental First Amendment rights, and therefore could
not survive the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United.
The district court agreed, and granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs but did not award fees.125
The Montana Supreme Court reversed, and attempted to distinguish
the case from Citizens United on three grounds. First, the Court said that the
plaintiffs had generally failed to “demonstrate any material way in which
Montana law hindered or censored their political activity or speech.”126
Second, the Court concluded that, unlike the complex federal laws struck
down in Citizens United, the Montana rules were simple, and therefore
there was a “material factual distinction” between the laws at issue in the
124. Montrust, 989 P.2d at 812.
125. WTP I, 271 P.3d at 1, 3.
126. Id. at 6.
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two cases.127 Third, the Court decided that the Montana law at issue “cannot be understood outside the context of the time and place it was enacted,”
and because the law was the result of actual and infamous corruption on a
local, state, and national level, it was somehow different than the laws
struck down in Citizens United.128 The Court therefore reversed the district
court, and concluded that “applying the principles enunciated in Citizens
United, it is clear that Montana has a compelling interest to impose the
challenged rationally-tailored statutory restrictions.”129
Justice Nelson dissented, and began with the soon-to-be-proved-correct statement that the “Supreme Court could not have been more clear in
Citizens United” that there is “virtually no conceivable basis for muzzling
or otherwise restricting corporate political speech in the form of independent expenditures.”130 Indeed, Justice Nelson even predicted that when
WTP appealed to the Supreme Court, “a summary reversal on the merits
would not surprise me in the least.”131
Justice Nelson, of course, proved correct. Less than six months after
WTP I, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a oneparagraph, per curiam opinion, summarily reversed the Montana Supreme
Court.132 The majority concluded “Montana’s arguments in support of the
judgment below either were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to
meaningfully distinguish that case.”133
B. Why WTP II was wrongly decided
On remand, WTP moved for an award of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, or alternatively, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”).134 To begin, the Court stated that under certain circumstances, the UDJA provides an “equitable” basis for attorney fee
127. Id. at 7–8.
128. Id. at 8–10. This publication has devoted substantial space to many exhaustively-researched and
comprehensive treatments of the corruption that gave rise to the laws at issue in WTP I. See e.g. William
P. Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Should Differences in a State’s
Political History and Culture Matter?, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 79 (2013); Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in
the West: Citizens United, Caperton, and the War of the Copper Kings, 73 Mont. L. Rev. 25–26 (2012);
Jeff Wiltse, The Origins of Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act: A More Complete History, 73 Mont. L.
Rev. 299 (2012). See also Anthony Johnstone, Foreword: The State of the Republican Form of Government in Montana, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 5, 19–20 (2013).
129. WTP I, 271 P.3d at 13.
130. Id. at 16–17 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
131. WTP I, 271 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted).
132. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (June 25, 2012).
133. Id.
134. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 547–548. Interestingly, WTP requested the Court consider the issue on
briefing submitted during WTP I, which the Court had never addressed because it had been mooted
based on the holding in that case.
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awards, and because the private attorney general doctrine is also based on
equitable considerations, the Court would “consider these arguments together.”135 Unfortunately, this conflation laid the foundation that created an
unsound analytical framework for the rest of the decision.
In its analysis, the Court did, at least, recite the three primary Montrust
factors.136 WTP argued it had “vindicated important free speech rights that
benefit all Montana citizens and corporations and will result in adding more
thoughts and views to the state’s political discourse.”137 The State disagreed, and argued there was “substantial overlap” between WTP’s vision
of the public interest and its own pecuniary interests.138
Yet, at least partially rejecting the State’s argument, the Court noted
“[t]he constitutional principles underlying this litigation cannot be
doubted.”139 Following Citizens United, it is the law of the land that “political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its
source is a corporation.”140
The Court then began the private attorney general analysis. First, citing
§ 2–15–501(1), it recognized that the Attorney General has a general duty
to defend a statute, but at the same time, retains discretion whether or not to
defend a statute’s constitutionality.141 Addressing this tension, the Court
stated that the judicial branch “must use caution in awarding fees against
the State in a ‘garden variety’ declaratory judgment action that challenges
the constitutionality of a statute that the Attorney General, in the exercise of
his executive power, has chosen to defend.”142 The Court then immediately
cited the bad faith statute, noting that the statute “cabined this executive
135. Id. at 548–549.
136. Id. at 549.
137. Id.
138. Id. The shadowy “pecuniary interests” underlying WTP’s (now ATP’s) motivations are well
outside the scope of this article. Suffice it to say, WTP/ATP and a number of state-level elected officials
are currently under investigation and/or facing sanctions due to allegations of illegal campaign coordination. See e.g. Mike Dennison, Motl: Strip State Rep. of Office or Fine Him, Helena Independent Record
(Jan. 25, 2014). In this article, Dennison notes Commissioner of Political Practices Jonathan Motl found
Representative Mike Miller of Helmville “should be removed from office or fined for accepting illegal
campaign help from secretive conservative groups”—namely, WTP/ATP. Further, Motl also recently
filed “another round” of complaints, including one alleging Senate Majority Leader Art Wittich “may
have illegally coordinated with Western Tradition Partnership and affiliated groups in his 2010 campaign.” Motl, Helena Independent Record (Jan. 25, 2014). Notably, Wittich’s law firm represented WTP
before the Montana Supreme Court in both WTP I and WTP II. Complicating the issue even further,
Motl represented amici siding with the State in WTP I. See also LeFer v. Murry, CV 13-06-BLG-DWM,
2013 WL 5651415 (D. Mont. Oct. 15, 2013) (outlining factual history of WTP-associated documents
that may tend to corroborate illegal campaign coordination between WTP/ATP and a number of Montana candidates and officeholders).
139. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 549.
140. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
141. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 550 (citing Associated Press v. State of Mont., 820 P.2d 421 (1991)).
142. Id.
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discretion,” and found that the bad faith standard “serves as a guidepost in
analyzing a claim for fees under the private attorney general doctrine.”143
The only apparent support for that reasoning comes from Bean Lake II,
where, as WTP II noted, the Court had determined that the Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks had “acted in good faith and in accordance with
constitutional and statutory mandates” in defending the public’s recreational use rights.144 The Court did note, however, that the statute was not
necessarily controlling because Montrust had established that the private
attorney general doctrine is an equitable exception to the American Rule.145
According to the Court, Montrust was not a “garden variety” declaratory judgment action because it involved “unique issues” implicating the
State’s potential breach of fiduciary duties and constitutional obligations.146
In contrast, here the Court held that the State “mounted a good faith defense” to WTP’s claims, and it “is difficult to conclude that [the Attorney
General’s] arguments were frivolous when five members of this Court were
convinced of their merit.”147
Thus, even though the Court implicitly recognized that WTP had satisfied the first Serrano factor after it had undoubtedly “vindicated principles
of constitutional magnitude,” because the State’s defense was also
“grounded in constitutional principles” and of concern to Montana citizens,
the Court determined WTP was not entitled to fees.148 That is because the
“challenge was brought in a time of shifting legal landscapes,” and WTP
could not meet its burden to show that the government had failed to properly enforce interests which are significant to its citizens.149 Of course, this
analysis all happened in one paragraph. Instead of continuing on with its
analysis, the court stopped here, after it determined the “predicate for an
award” had not been established, because apparently the citizens of Montana were unhappy with Citizens United and the actions of WTP.150
But there are at least two distinct problems with the Court’s analysis.
First, and most fundamentally, it failed to actually undertake an analysis of
the second and third Serrano factors.151 Indeed, there is no analysis of those
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Bean Lake II, 782 P.2d at 900).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 550.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (This conclusion can be inferred from the Court’s closing sentence: “The challenge was
brought in a time of shifting legal landscapes, the contours of which still have not finally been defined.
Under these circumstances, the predicate for an award of fees under the private attorney general doctrine—‘when the government, for some reason, fails to properly enforce interests which are significant
to its citizens’—has not been established.”).
151. This issue is covered far more extensively in Justice Nelson’s dissent.
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factors whatsoever. In a conjunctive test, if the first part fails, then it is
unnecessary to move on to the second and third parts. But here, the Court’s
own analysis showed WTP did meet its burden under the first factor as it
had been previously applied, and it appears WTP would have likely met its
burden on the other parts of the test. There is little doubt of the necessity for
WTP’s private enforcement of fundamental First Amendment rights. It is
highly unusual for a private plaintiff to be forced to litigate all the way to
the U.S. Supreme Court and then have the Court grant certiorari. That alone
indicates the sheer magnitude of the plaintiffs’ burden. When the Supreme
Court reverses summarily, that should be sufficient evidence that the State’s
argument and the Montana Supreme Court’s reasoning were weak, at best.
Likewise, whether the Montana Supreme Court or the general public likes it
or not, the vindication of what the U.S. Supreme Court has recently recognized as fundamental First Amendment rights will benefit a substantial
number of Montana citizens, if not all of us.152
The second, and perhaps most legally significant mistake, was the insertion of a bad faith element into the private attorney general doctrine.
Contrary to the Court’s arguments, Bean Lake II does not stand for the
proposition that the private attorney general doctrine requires a showing of
bad faith. Instead, the Bean Lake Court’s reference to bad faith was the
epitome of dicta, and in any event, was proper for the analysis in that case.
That is because there, the Department had a specific statutory mandate to
litigate water rights issues on behalf of Montana citizens. In contrast, the
Attorney General certainly has no statutory mandate to litigate against the
established First Amendment rights of Montana citizens. Indeed, the very
notion is absurd. This issue was also directly addressed in Montrust, where
the Court recognized that the Attorney General’s duty to defend statutes is
precisely why the private attorney general doctrine exists—to encourage
enforcement of constitutional interests which may trump the very statute the
Attorney General is required to defend.153

152. See WTP II, 291 P.3d at 550 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“As a matter of federal constitutional law,
all Montana citizens—at least, every voter in Montana—benefitted from the . . . decision in favor of
ATP under Citizens United.”).
153. Montrust, 989 P.2d at 812. (“[T]he State argues that it had a duty to defend the statutes in the
present case; thus, the State does not dispute the necessity of private enforcement of Montana’s Constitution.”). Another potential problem exists with the divided executive power in Montana—what happens
if the Governor and the Attorney General disagree on the constitutionality of a statute? The entire WTP
situation may have worked out very differently if our present Governor and Attorney General had been
in office rather than the last combination, which appeared to generally agree on policy issues. The
delegates at the 1972 Constitutional Convention discussed this tension. See Mont. Const. art. VI, § 4;
Mont. Code Ann. § 2–15–501 (2011) (setting forth the duties of the Attorney General). See also 1972
Constitutional Convention Transcript at 866–870 (discussing whether the Attorney General should be
appointed by the governor or elected by popular vote).
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It is also worth noting that, although Bean Lake II discussed bad faith,
it did not actually apply the private attorney general doctrine—it simply
recognized it as a viable theory. In each and every one of the cases where
the Court actually addressed the doctrine in any significant manner, it never
applied a bad faith analysis. This is consistent with the three-part test itself,
because the plain language of the test makes clear that a bad faith analysis
is not a part of the inquiry. It is also consistent with the manner in which
other courts apply the doctrine.154 Further, as noted in Justice Nelson’s dissent, in Montrust, the district court specifically rejected the claim for fees
due to the absence of bad faith, yet the Court nevertheless reversed after
determining the plaintiffs had established they were entitled to fees.155 It
did so regardless of the district court’s finding that the State had not engaged in any frivolous, extreme, or bad faith conduct.156
WTP (now ATP) is not a likable organization. In fact, it is likely WTP
currently exists in name only. Those associated with it—including the law
firm associated with WTP II, which includes elected officials—are under
scrutiny from the State Commissioner of Political Practices.157 It may also
be that WTP was—on remand after summary reversal—a juridical persona
non grata, and the Court found it repugnant to award fees to such an unpopular plaintiff who prevailed against what so many saw as a brave decision in
WTP I. Nevertheless, that is not sufficient grounds to misapply an established judicial doctrine.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, the WTP II dissent provides a more thorough analysis of
the three-factor test and why WTP clearly satisfied each element of that
test. This article does not seek to recreate that dissent. Instead, I hope a brief
overview of the important attorney general doctrine cases decided by the
Montana Supreme Court vindicates the dissent, which I believe reached the
proper conclusion.
Since 1999, the Court has only awarded fees under the doctrine twice,
and has remanded a case to the district court for consideration of the doc154. See e.g. Punsly v. Ho, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 97–98 (Cal. 2003) (“Bad faith is not a statutory
criteria under [the private attorney general statute].”).
155. WTP II, 291 P.3d at 551–552 (Nelson, J. dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Charles S. Johnson, American Tradition Partnership is Back, Helena Independent Record
(April 6, 2014). Here, Johnson notes that Governor Bullock advised the general public that “[a]n organization like [WTP] doesn’t rely on the public trust. They just rely on sheer distortions and shell games.”
The articles goes on to note that in 2013, Lewis and Clark County district court Judge Sherlock fined
ATP over $260,000 for its attempts to “evade Montana’s campaign and reporting requirements,” but that
the State had not yet entered judgment because Bullock and Commissioner Motl are considering
whether to “pierce the veil” and seek satisfaction of a judgment from ATP officers individually.
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trine on one other occasion. That fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate that
the private attorney general doctrine is not being abused—and also likely
illustrates why it has not generated any significant legislative response.
In the two cases where the Court awarded fees, the awards seem legitimate in retrospect. In the cases which were closer but no fees were
awarded, perhaps questions remain. One area those questions will likely
focus is what—exactly or even inexactly—constitutes a “significant constitutional interest.” But in any case, if the Court wants to walk back its own
judicially-created doctrine, it of course may do so. But it should do so
openly, acknowledging what it is doing, instead of conflating two entirely
separate legal theories and then ignoring the actual requirements of the theory upon which it should decide the case. That is especially true when addressing a case on remand from a summary reversal at the United States
Supreme Court affirming “fundamental” First Amendment principles,
where the denial of fees could suggest—ironically—bad faith.
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